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OPINION IN THE "LUSITANIA" CASES
November 1, 1923

(Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany, p. 17)

Umpire, delivered the opinion of the commission, the American and German commissioners concurring in the conclusions:
These cases grow out of the sinking of the British
ocean liner Lusitania, which was torpedoed by a German statement of
submarine off the coast of Ireland May 7, 1915, duringcase.
the period of American neutrality. Of the 197 American
citizens aboard the Lusitania at that time, 69 were saved
.and 128 lost. The circumstances of the sinking are
known to all the 'vorld, and as liability for losses sustained by American nationals was assumed by the Gov-ernment of Germany through its note of February 4,
1916, it 'vould serve no useful purpose to rehearse them
here.
Applying the rules laid down in Administrative Decisions Nos. I and II handed down this date, 1 the commis- Rules of romsion finds that Germany is financially obligated to pay mission.
to the United States all losses suffered by American nationals, stated in terms of dollars, where the claims
therefor have continued in American ownership, which
losses have resulted from death or from personal injury
or from loss of, or damage to, property sustained in the
sinking of the 'Lusitania.
This finding disposes of this group of claims, save that
there remain to be considered (1) issues involving the
nationality of each claimant affecting the commission's
jurisdiction, and (2) the measure of damages to be applied
to the facts of each case.
PARKER,

Reference is made to Administrative Decision No. I for the definition of the terms
used herein.
'Ve are here dealing with a group of cases all growing out of a single catastrophe. As
it is manifestly of paramount importance that the same rules of decision shall govern
the disposition of each and all of them, whether disposed of by agreement between the two
commissioners or in the event of their disagreement by the umpire, this opinion announcing such rules is, at the request of the two commissioners, prepared by the umpire,
both commissioners concurring in the conclusions. The principles and rules here laid
down will, where applicable, govern the American and German agents and their respective counsel in the preparation and presentation of all claims.
1
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Damages.

In this decision rules applicable to the measure of
damages in death cases will be considered. In formulating such rules and determining the \Veight to be given
to the decisions of courts and tribunals dealing v;ith this
subject, it is important to bear in mind the basis of recovery in death cases in the jurisdictions announcing
such decisions.
At common law there existed no cause of action for
damages caused by the death of a human being. The
right to maintain such actions has, however, been long
conferred by statutes enacted by Great Britain and by
all of the American States. The German code expressly
recognizes liability for the taking of life. 2 These legislative enactments vary in their terms to such an extent
that there can not be evolved from the1n and the decisions of the courts construing them any co1nposite
uniform rules governing this branch of the la\v. Such
statutes and decisions as well as the other governing
principles set out in this commission's Administrative
Decision No. II will, however, be considered in determining the applicable rules governing the measuring of
damages in death cases.
The statutes enacted in comrnon-law jurisdictions conferring a cause of action in death cases \vhere none before
existed have frequently limited by restrictive terms the
rules for measuring damages in such cases. The tendency,
however, of both statutes and decisions is to give such
elasticity to these restrictive rules as to enable courts
and juries in applying them to the facts of each particu--:
lar case to award full and fair compensation for the injury suffered and the loss sustained. 3 The statutes of
several States of the American Union authorize juries to
award such damages as are "fair and just" or "proportionate to the injury." Under such statutes the
decisions of the courts give to the juries 1nuch broader
latitude in assessing damages than those of other States
2 Section 823. See also Huebner's "History of Germanic Private Law," 1918, pp.
578-579, and Schuster's "Principles of German Civil Law," 1907, sees. 284-286.
a Nohrden v. Northeastern Railroad Go., 1900, 59 South Carolina Reports 87, 105-108,
37 Southeastern Reporter 228, 238-240; Stuckey v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Go., 1901,
60 South Carolina Reports 237, 252-253; Parker v. Crowell & Spencer Lu77.Lber Go., 1905,
115 Louisiana Reports 463, 468, 39 Southern Reporter 445, 446; Bourg v. Brownell- Drews
Lumber Go., 1908, 120 Louisiana Reports 1009, 1022-1027, 45 Southern Reporter 972,
977-979; Seaboard Airline Railway v. Moseley, 1910, 60 Fl.orida Heports 186, 189; Peters
v. Southa-n Pacific Go., 1911, 160 California Reports 48, 69-71; Underu·ood v. Gulf Refining Go., 1911, 128 Louisiana Reports 968, 937-1003, 55 Southern Reporter 641, 646653; Johnson v. Industrial Lumber Go., 1912, 131 Louisiana Reports 897, 910, 60 Southern
Reporter 608, 612.
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'vhere the statutes expressly limit them to so-called
"pecuniary injuries," 4 which is a term much misunderstood.
In most of the jurisdictions where the civil law is administered and where the right of action for injuries
resulting in death has long existed independent of any
code or statute containing restrictions on rules for
measuring damages, the courts have not been hampered in so formulating such rules and adapting them to
the facts of each case as to give complete compensation
for the loss sustained.
It is a general rule of both the civil and common la'v
that every invasion of private right imports an injury
and that for every such injury the law gives a remedy.
Speaking generally, that remedy must be commensurate
with the injury received. It is variously expressed as
"compen3ation," "reparation," "indemnity," "recompense,'' and is measured by pecuniary standards, because,
says Grotius, 5 "money is the common measure of valuable things."
In death cases the right of action is for the loss sustained
by the claimants, not by the estate. The basis of damages
is, not the physical or mental suffering of deceased or his
loss or the loss to his estate, but the losses resulting to
claimants from his death. The inquiry then is: What
amount 'viii compensate claimants for such losses~
Bearing in mind that we are not concerned with any
problems involving the punishment of a 'vrongdoer but
only with the naked question of fixing the amount 'vhich
4 ~Iynning v. The Detroit, Lansing & Northern Railroad Co., 1886, 59 1\,I ichigan Reports
257, 261-262, 26 Northwestern Reporter 514, 516-517; Simmons v. ~Ic Connell, 1890, 86
Virginia Reports 494, 496-497, 10 Southeastern Reporter 838, 839; Tlte Ohio and Jfississippi Railu.,.ay Co. v. Wangelin, 1894, 152 Illinois Reports 138, 142, 38 Northeastern Reporter 760, 761; Turner v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 1895, 40 West Virginia Reports 675,
638-689, 693-695, 22 Southeastern Reporter 83, 87, 9; Strother v. South Carolina & Georgia
Railroad Co., 1896, 47 South Carolina Reports 375, 383-384, 25 Southeastern Reporter
272, 274; 1lfason v. Southern Railu·ay Co., 1900, 58 South Carolina Reports 70, 77, 36
Southeastern Reporter 440, 442; Parl;er v. Crowell & Spencer Lumber Co., 1905, 115
Louisiana Reports 463, 468, 39 Southern Reporter 445, 446; Norfolk & Western Railu·ay
Co. v. Cheatwood's Administratrix, 1905, 103 Virginia Reports 356, 364-365, 49 Southeastern Reporter 48!, 491-192; Butte Electric Ry. Co. v. Jor.es, 1908, C. C. A., 164 Federal •
Reporter 308, 311, 18 Lawyers' Heports Annotated (New Series) 1205, 1208; Brennen
v. Chicago & Carterville Coal Co., 1909, 147 Illinois Appellate Court Reports 263, 270273; Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Ilau·kins ("West Virginia), 1909, C. C. A., 174 Federal
Reporter 597, 601-602, 98 Circuit Court of Appeals 443, 447-448.
s "The Rights of War and Peace," by llugo Grotius, Whewell translation, 1853 (herenafter cited as "Grotius"), Book II, Ch. XVII, Sec. XXII; Sedgwick on Damages,
9th (1912) edition (hereinafter cited as "Sedgwick"), Sec. 30.
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vrill compensate for the wrong done, our formula expressed
general terms for reaching that end is: Estimate the
amounts (a) which the decedent, had he not been killed,
would probably have contributed to the claimant, add
thereto (b) the pecuniary value to such claimant of the
deceased's personal services in claimant's care, education,
or supervision, and also add (c) reasonable compensation
for such 1nental suffering or shock, if any, caused by the
violent severing of family ties, as claimant may actually
have sustained by reason of such death. The sum of
these estimates, reduced to its present cash value, \Vill
generally represent the loss sustained by claimant.
In making such estimates there \vill be considered,
among other factors, the follo,ving:
(a) The age, sex, health, condition and station in life,
occupation, habits of industry and sobriety, mental and
physical capacity, frugality, earning capacity and customary earnings of the deceased and the uses made of such
earnings by him:
(b) The probable duration of the life of deceased but
for the fatal injury, in arriving at vrhich standard lifeexpectancy tables and all other pertinent evidence
offered will be considered;
(c) The reasonable probability that the earning capacity of deceased, had he lived, would either have increased
or decreased;
(d) The age, sex, health, condition and station in life,
and probable life expectancy of each of the claimants;
(e) The extent to which the deceased, had he lived,
would have applied his income from his earnings or·
other\vise to his personal expenditures from \Vhicb
claimants would have derived no benefits;
(f) In reducing to their present cash value contributions
which would probably have been made from time to time
to claimants by deceased, a 5 per cent interest rate and
standard present-value tables \Vill be used;
(g) Neither the physical pain nor the mental anguish
\Vhich the deceased may have suffered will be considered
as elements of damage;
(h) The amount of insurance on the life of the deceased
0ollected by his estate or by the clain1ants \vill not. be
taken into account in computing the damages which
~laimants may be entitled to recover;
(i) No exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages
can be assessed.

Bases of esti- in
mate.

BAS.ES OF DAMAGES

The foregoing statement of the rules for measuring
damages in death cases \Vill be applied by the American
agent and the German agent and their respective
counsel in the preparation and submission of all such
cases. The enumeration of factors to be taken into
account in assessing damages \vill not be considered as
exclusive of all others. When either party conceives
that other faetors should be considered, having a tendency
either to increase or decrease the quantum of damages,
such factors will be called to the attention of the commission in the presentation of the particular case.
l\1ost of the elements entering into the rules here
expressed for measuring damages, and the factors to
be taken into account in applying them, are so obv-iously
sound and firmly established by both the civil and coinmon law authorities as to make further elaboration
wholly unnecessary. As counsel for Germany, however,
very earnestly contends that the mental suffering of a
claimant does not constitute a recoverable element of
damage in death cases, and also contends that life
insurance paid claimants on the happening of the death
of deceased should be deducted in estimating the claimant's loss, we will state the reasons why we are unable
to adopt either of these contentions. The American
counsel, with equal earnestness, contends that exemplary,
punitive, and vindictive damages should be assessed
against Germany for the use and benefit of each private
claimant. For the reasons hereinafter set forth at
length this contention is rejected.
Mental suffering.-The legal concept of damages is
judicially ascertained compensation for wrong. The
compensation must be adequate and balance as near
as may be the injury suffered. In many tort cases,
including those for personal injury and for death, it is
manifestly impossible to compute rnathematically or
with any degree of accuracy or by the use of any precise
formula the damages sustained, involving such inquiries
as how long the deceased would probably have lived
but for the fatal injury; the amount he would have
earned, and of such earnings the amount he \vould M en t a1
have contributed to each member of his family; the ing.
pecuniary value of his supervision over the education
and training of his children; the amount \Vhich \viii
reasonably compensate an injured man for suffering
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excruciating and prolonged physical pain; and many
other inquiries concerning elements universally recognized as constituting recoverable damages. This, ho"\vever, furnishes no reason 'vhy the "\Vrongdoer should
escape repairing his wrong or "\vhy he "\vho suffered
should not receive reparation therefor measured by
rules as nearly approximating accuracy as human
ingenuity can devise. To deny such reparation would
be to deny the fundamental principle that there exists
remedy for the direct invasion of every right.
Mental suffering is a fact just as real as physical
suffering, and susceptible of measurement by the same
standards. The interdependency of the mind and the
body, now universally recognized, may result in a mental
shock producing physical disorders. But quite apart
from any such result, there can be no doubt of the reality
of mental suffering; of sickness of mind as well as sickness
of body, and of its detrimental and injurious effect on the
individual and on his capacity to produce. Why, then,
should he be remediless for this injury? The courts of
France under the provisions of the Code Napoleon have
always held that mental suffering or "prejudice morale"
is a proper element to be considered in actions brought
for injuries resulting in death. A like rule obtains in
several American States, including Louisiana, South
Carolina, and Florida. 6 The difficulty of measuring
mental suffering or loss of mental capacity is conceded,
but the law does not refuse to take notice of such injury
on account of the difficulty of ascertaining its degree.
On careful analysis it will be found that decisions
announcing a contrary rule by some of the American
courts are measurably influenced by the restrictions
imposed by the language of the statutes creating the
right of action for injuries resulting in death. As hereinafter pointed out, these very restrictions have in some
instances driven the courts to permit the juries to award
as exemplary damages what were in truth compensatory
da1nages for mental suffering, rather than leave the
plaintiff without a remedy for a real injury sustained.
G Nohrden v. Northeastern Railroad Co., 1900, 59 South Carolina Reports 87, 105-108,
37 Southeastern Reporter 228, 238-240; Stuckey v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 1901,
60 South Carolina Reports 237, 253; Bourg v. Brownell-Drews Lumber Co., 1908, 120
Louisiana Reports 1009, 1022-1026, 45 Southern Reporter 972, 977-978; Seaboard Air Line
Railway v. }rfoseley, 1910, 60 Florida Reports 186, 18!>-190; Underwood v. Gulf Refining
Co., 1911, 128 Louisiana Reports 869, 986, U90-1003; Johnson v. Industrial Lumber Co.
1912, 131 Louisiana Heports 897, 908-909.
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Mental suffering to form a basis of recovery must be
real and actual, rather than purely sentimental and
vague. 7
Insurance.-Counsel for Germany insist that in arriving 1nsumnce no t
at clain1ants' net loss there should be deducted from the to
benefit wro ng
doer.
present value of the contributions which the deceased
would probably have made to claimants had he lived all
payments made to claimants under policies of insurance
on the life of deceased. The contention is opposed to
all American decisions and the more recent decisions of
the English courts. The various reasons given for these
decisions are, however, for the most part inconclusive and
unsatisfactory. But it is believed that the contention
here made by the counsel for Germany is based upon a
misconception of the essential nature of life insurance
and the relations of the beneficiaries thereto.
Unlike marine and fire insurance, a life insurance contract is not one of indemnity, but a contract absolute in
its terms for the payment of an amount certain on the
happening of an event certain-death-at a time uncertain. The consideration for the claiinants' contractrights is the premium paid. These premiums are based
upon the risk taken and are proportioned to the amount
of the policy. The contract is in the nature of an investment made either by, or in behalf of, the beneficiaries.
'fhe claimants' rights under the insurance contracts
existed prior11to the commission of the act complained of,
and prior to the death of deceased. Under the terms of
the contract these rights were to be exercised by claimants
upon the happening of a certain event. The mere fact
that the act complained of hastened that event can not
inure to Germany's benefit, as there was no uncertainty
as to the happening of the event, but only as to the time
of its happening. Sooner or later payn1ent must be made
under the insurance contract. Such payment of insurance, far fro1n springing from Germany's act, is entirely
foreign to it. If it be said that the acceleration of death
secures to the claimants now \Vhat might other\\rise have
been paid to others had deceased survived claimantcs, and
that therefore claimants may possibly have benefited
through Germany's act, the ans\ver is that the law will
not for the benefit of the "\Vrongdoer enter the do1nai-o of
speeulation and consider the probability or probabilities
7

Sedgwick, sec. 46a.

180

CLAIMS COMMISSION-UNITED STATES AND GERMANY

in order to offset an absolute and certain contract right
against the uncertain damages flo\ving from a wrong.
Dse of life-expectancy and present-value tables.-Ordinarily the facts to which must be applied the rules of
law in measuring damages in death cases lie largely in
the future. It results that, absolute kno,vledge being
impossible, the law of probabilities and of averages must
be resorted to in estimating damages, and these preclude
Useofinsurance the possibility of makinO' any precise computations or
tables.
o
~
mathen1atical calculations. Ad an aid-but solely as an
aid-in estimating damages in this clas3 of cases, the
con1mission will consider the standard life-expectancy
and present-value tables. These will be used not as
absolute guides but in connection \vith other evidence,·
such as the condition of the health of deceased, the risks
incident to his vocation, and any other circumstances
tending to throw light on the probable length of his life
but for the act of Germany complained of. To the
extent that happenings subsequent to the death of deceased make certain what was before uncertain, to such
extent the rules of probabilities will be discarded.
Neither will we lose sight of the fact that life tables are
based on statistics of the length of life of individuals, not
upon the duration of their physical or mental capacity
or of their earning powers. In using such tables it will
be borne in mind that the present value of the probable
earnings of deceased depends on many more unknowable
contingencies than does the present value of a life annuity
or dower. Included among these contingencies are
possible and probable periods of illness, periods of unemployment even when well, and various degrees of disability arising from gradually increasing age. The weight
to be given to such tables \vill, therefore, be determined
by the commis3ion in the light of ~he facts developed
in each particular case.
Exemplary damages.-American counsel with great
earnestness insists ·that exemplary, or, as they are frequently designated, punitive and vindictive, da1nages
~hould be assessed by this commission against Gern1any
in behalf of private claimants. Because of the importance of the question presented the nature of exemplary
damages will he examined and the commission's reasons
for declining to assess such damages \vill be fully stated.
Undoubtedly the rule permitting the recovery of exemplary damages as such is firmly intrenched in the
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jurisprudence of most of the States of the Americanda~~g~~piarY
Union: although it has been repudiated by the courts of
s3veral of them and its soundness on principle is challenged by some of the leading American text writers. 8
The re.ason for the rule authorizing the imposition of
exemplary in addition to full reparation or compensatory da1nages is that they are justified ''by way of punishing the guilty, and as an example to deter others from
offending in like manner." 9 The source of the rule is
frequently traced to a remark alleged to have been made
by Lord Chief Justice Pratt (afterwands Lord Camden)
in instructing a jury (italics ours) that : 10
"Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to
the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the
guilty, to deter fro1n any such proceeding for the future,
and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action
. if"
~tse
.
That such a charge was ever in fact given has been
questioned. 11 1-Io\vever this 1nay be, this alleged instruction has been quoted and requoted by the courts of
England and of America as authority for the awarding of
exemplary damages where the tort complained of has
been wilfully or wantonly or maliciously inflicted.
In some of the earlier cases the awards of exemplary
damages were sustained "for example's sake" and "to
prevent such offense in the future," and again "to inflict
damages for example's sake and by way of punishing the
defendant." In one early New York case 12 it was said:
"We concede that smart money allowed by a jury, and
a fine imposed at the suit . of the people, depend on the
sa1ne principle. Both are penal, and intended to deter
others from the commission of the like crime."
In our opinion the words exemplary, vindictive, or
punitive as applied to damages are misnomers. ~ The
fundamental concept of "damages" is satisfaction, reparation for a loss suffered; a judicially ascertained compensation for wrong. 13 The remedy should be commensurate with the loss, so that the injured party may
s Fay v. Parker, 1873, 53 New Hampshire Reports 342; Sedgwick, sec. 354; Greenleaf on
Evidence, 1!ith (1892) edition, Vol. II, sees. 253, 254, 266, and 267.
9 Lake Shore & J-lichigan Southern Railway Co. v. Prentice, 1893, 147 United St ates
Reports 101, 107.
1o Wilkes v. lVood, 1763, 19 Howell's State Trials (1816) 1153, 1167, LotTt 's R eports
(li90), pages 1 and 19 of first case.
11 Sedgwick, sec. 350.
12 Cook v. Ellis, 1844, 6 Hill's (New York) Reports 466, 467.
13 Sedgwick, sec. 57la.
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be made whole. 14 'l'he superimposing of a penalty in
ttddition to full compensation and na1ning it damages,
'vith the qualifying word exemplary, vindictive, or
punitive, is a hopeless confusion of terms, inevitably
leading to confusion of thought. Many of the American
authorities lay down the rule that where no actual damage
has been suffered no exemplary damages can be allowed,
giving as a reason that the latter are awarded, not because
the plaintiff has any right to recover them, but because
the d~fendant deserves punishment for his wrongful acts;
and that, as the plaintiff can not maintain an action
merely to inflict punishment upon a supposed wrongdoer,
if he has no cause of action independent of a supposed
right to recover exemplary damages, he has no cause of
action at all. 15 It is apparent that the theory of the
rule is not based upon any right of the plaintiff to receive
the a'vard assessed against the defendant, but that the
defendant should be punished. The more el).lightened
principles of government and of la'v clothe the state 'vith
the sole power to punish but insure to the individual full,
adequate, and complete compensation for a 'vrong inflicted to his detriment. 16
An examination of the American authorities leads to
the conclusion that the exemplary damage rule owes its
origin and gro\vth, to some extent at least, to the difficulties experienced by judges in tort cases of clearly
defining in their instructions to juries the different
fac.tors which may be taken into account and readily
applied by them in assessing the quantum of damages
which a plaintiff may recover. It is difficult to lay
down any rule for measuring injury to the feelings, or
humiliation or shame, or mental suffering, and yet it
frequently happens ·that such injuries are very real and
ca.Zl for compensation as act1~al damages as much as
u Grotius, Book II Chap. XVII, Sec. X: Blackstone's Commentaries, Book II, ehap.
29, Sec. VII, par. 2 (*p. 438); Sedgwiek; see. 29.
16 Schippel v. Norton, 1888, 38 Kansas Reports 567, 572; Meighan v. Birmingham Terminal Co., 1910, 165 Alabama Reports 591, 599.
16 Vattel's Law of Nations, Chitty edition with notes by Ingraham ,1852 (1857), (hereinafter cited as "Vattel") Book I, sec. 169, where it is said: "Now, when men unite i!l
soeiety-as the society is thenceforward eharged with the duty of providing for the safety
of its members, the individuals all resign to it their private right of punishing. To the
whole body, therefore, it belongs to avenge private injuries, while it protects the citizcn3
~t large. And as it is a moral person, capable also of being injured, it has a right to pro·
vide for its own safety, by punishing those who trespass against it-that is to say, it has
a right to punish publie delinquents. Hence arises the right of the sword, which belongs
to a nation, or to its eonductor. Vlhen the soeicty use it against another nation, they
make war; when they exert it in punishing an individual, they exercise vindictive
justiee."

COl\fPENSATORY DAMAGES

physical pain and suffering and n1any other elements
which, though difiicult to lneasure by pecuniary standards, are, nevertheless, universally considered in R\Varding
compensatory damages. The trial judges,_ following the
lead of Lord Camden, 17 have found it easier to permit
the juries to award plaintiffs in the 'vay of damages a
penalty assessed against defendants guilty of willful,
malicious, or outrageous conduct to,vard the plaintiffs,
rather than undertake to formulate rules to enable the
juries to measure in pecuniary terms the extent of the
actual injuries. 18 In cases cited and numerous others,
the damages dealt with and designated by the court as
"exemplary" 'vere in their nature purely compensatory
and awarded as reparation for actual injury sustained.
That one injured is, under the rules of international
law, entitled to be compensated for an injury inflicted
resulting in mental suffering, injury to his feelings,
humiliation, shame, degradation, loss of social position
or injury to his credit or to his reputation, there can be
no doubt, and such colnpensation should be commensurate to the injury. Such damages are very real, and
the mere fact that they are difficult to measure or estimate by money standards makes them none the less
real and affords no reason why the injured person should
not be compensated therefor as compensatory damages,
but not as a penalty. The tendency of the decisions and
statutes of the several American States seems to be to
broaden the scope of the elements to be considered in
assessing actual and compensatory damages, 'vith the
corresponding result of narrowing the application of the
exemplary damages rule. 1 g
The industry of counsel has failed to point us to any
money award by an international arbitral tribunal 'vhere
Wilkes v. lVood, note 10 supra.
Boydan v. Haberstumpf, 1901, 129 Michigan Reports 137, where it was held (p. 140;
italics ours) that the term "exemplary damages," as employed in Michigan, "has
generally been understood to mean an increased award of damages in view of the supposed aooravation of the injury to the feelings by the wanton or reckless act of the
• defendant," and that "It has never been the policy of the court to permit jurie~ to
award captiously any sum which may appear just to them, by way of punishment to
the offender, but rather to award a sum in addition to the actual proven damages, as
:vhat, in their judgment, constitutes a ju.st mea,mre of compensation for injury to feel·
1ngs, in view of the circumstances of each particular case.''
Peoram v. Stortz, 1888, 31 West Virginia Reports 220, 229, 242-24::1; Gzl!inoham v. Ohio
River Railroad Co., 1891,35 West Virginia Reports 588, 599-GOO; Levy v. Flei.~chner, .Mayer
& Co., 1895, 12 Wash!ngton Reports 15, 17-18.
19 Sec the cases cited in note (i above. Jn the cnsc cited from 128 Loni!dana Reports
the court said, at page ~92, "the idea that damages allowed for mental sufTering nre
exemplary, punitory, or vindictive in their character has been very generally ahand oned, and they arc now recognized hy thi3 court and otbcr courts as actual and
compensatory.''
17
18
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Moke case.

exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages have been
assessed against' one sovereign nation in favor of another
presenting a claim in behalf of its nationals. 20 Great
stress is laid by counsel on the Moses Moke case 21
which arose under the convention between the United
States and Mexico of July 4, 1868. !vloke, an American
citizen, was subjected to a day's imprisonment to" force''
him to "loan" $1,000. l-Ie sought to recover the amount
of the "loan" and damages. The American Commissioner vVadsworth, speaking for the commission, said:
''We wish to condemn the practice of forcing loans by
the n1ilitary, and think an award of $500 for 24 hours'
imprisonment will be sufficient * * * If larger sums
in damages, in such cases, were needed to vindicate the
right of individuals to be exempt from such abuses, \Ve
'vould undoubtedly feel required to give them."
This language is the nearest approach to a recognition
of the doctrine of exemplary damages that we have found
in any reported decision of a mixed arbitral tribunal, b.ut
we do not regard the decision in this case as a recognition
of this doctrine. On the contrary, an award of $500 for
the humiliation and inconvenience suffered by this
American citizen for the outrageous treatment accorded
2o "International Arbitral Law and Procedure," by Jackson H. Ralston, 1910, sec. 369,
where he says:
"While there is little doubt that in many cases the idea of punishment bas influenced
the amount of the award, yet we are not prepared to state that any commission has
accepted the view that it possessed the power to grant anything save compensation.
* * *"
Borchard's "The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad," 1915 (1922), sec. 174,
makes substantially the same statement in these words: "Arbitral commissions, while
often apparently taking into consideration the seriousness of the offense and the idea
of punishment in fixing the amount of an award, have generally regarded their powers
as limited to the granting of compensatory, rather than exemplary, damages."
Doctor Lieber, umpire of the commission under the convention of July 4, 1868, between
tho United States and Mexico, in awarding the sum of $4,000 on an $85,000 claim, said
(p. 4311, Vol. IV, of Moore's "History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to
which the United States Has Been a Party," 1898, hereinafter cited as "l\ioore's Arbitrations"): "Nor can these high damages be explained as exemplary damages. Our
commission has no punitive mission, nor is there any offense to be punished."
See also opinion of Umpire Bertinatti in the case of Ogden, administrator of the estate
of Isaac Harrington, in which an award of $1,000 \Vas made on an original demand of
$160,000 where the claim was made that an American citizen was treated oppressively
and with great indignity by Costa Rica. II lVIoore's Arbitrations, p. 1566.
21 IV Moore's Arbitrations, 3411.
Counsel also lays much stress on the language used by Um:pire Duffield of the GermanVenezuelan Mixed Claims Commission in the Metzger case (pp. 578-580, "Venezuelan
Arbitrations of 1903," report by Jackson H. Ralston, 19(}1, hereinafter cited as "Vcnezuel:m Arbitrations 1903"), where it is said (p. 580: italics ours): "Neither can anything
be allo\ved in the way of punith·c or exemplary damages against Venezuela, because it
appears, as above stateu, that the general commanding the army promptly took action
against the o1Tender and punished him by imprisonment." Clearly this is dictltm.
The case was apparently correctly decided and there was no reason for giving any careful consideration to the right of the commission to go further than award compensatory
damages.

T'R.EATY OBLIGATIONS

him by the Mexican authorities can hardly be said to be
adequate compensation. Certainly the award has in it
none of the elements of punishment, nor can it be evoked
as an example to deter other nations from according
similar treatment to American citizens.
But it is not necessary for this commission to go to the
length of holding that exemplary damages can not be
awarded in any case by any international arbitral tribunal. A sufficient reason \vhy such damages can not be
a\varded by this commission is that it is without the t·Ions.
Treaty
power to make such awards under the terms of its charter-the treaty of Berlin. It will be borne in mind that
this is a "treaty between the United States and Germany
restoring friendly relations "-a treaty of peace. Its
terms negative the concept of the imposition of a penalty
by the United States against Germany, save that the
undertaking by Germany to make reparation to the
United States and its nationals as stipulated in the treaty
may partake of the nature of a penalty. 22
Part VII of the treaty of Versailles (arts. 227 to 230,
inclusive) deals with "penalties." It is significant that
these provisions were not incorporated in the treaty of
Berlin.
In negotiating the treaty of peace, the United States
and Germany were of course dealing directly with each
other. Had there been any intention on the part of the
United States to exact a penalty either as a punishment
or as an example and a deterrent, such intention would
have been clearly expressed in the treaty itself; and, had
it taken the form of a money payment, would have been
claimed by the Government of the United States on its
O\Vn behalf and not on behalf of its nationals. As to
such nationals, care was taken to provide for full and
adequate "indemnities," ''reparations," and "satisfaction" of their claims for losses, damages, or injuries
suffered by them. While under that portion of the treaty
of Versailles which has by reference been incorporated in
the treaty of Berlin, Germany "accepts" responsibility
for all loss and damage to \vhich the United ·States and
its nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the
'var, nevertheless the United States frankly recognizes
22 Oppenheim on International Law, 3d (1920) edition (hereinafter cited as "Oppenheim"), Vol. II, sec. 259a, p. 353, where it is said (italics ours): "There is no doubt that
if a belligerent can be made to pay compensation for all damage done by him in violating
the laws of war, this will be an indirect means of securing legitimate warfare."
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the fact ''that the resources of Germany are not adequate * * * to make complete reparation for all
such loss and damage", but requires that Germany make
''compensation" for specified damages suffered by American nationals. 23 For the enormous cost to the Government of the United States in prosecuting the war no claim
is made against Germany. No claims against Germany
are being asserted by the Government of the United
States on account of pensions paid, and compensation in
the nature of pensions paid, to naval and military victims
of the war and to their families and dependents. 24 In
view of this frank recognition by the Government of the
United States of Germany's inability to make to it full
and complete reparation for all of the consequences of the
war, how can it be contended that there should be read
into the treaty an obligation on the part of Germany to
pay penalties to the Government of the United States for
the use and benefit of a small group of American nationals
for 'vhose full and complet~ compensation for losses sustained adequate provision has been made?
The United States is in effect making one demand
against Germany on some 12,500 counts. That demand
is for compensation and reparation for certain losses sustained by the United States and its nationals. While in
determining the amount which Germany is to pay, each
claim must be considered separately, no one of them can
be disposed of as an isolated claim or suit, but must be
considered in relation to all others presented in this one
demand. In all of the claims the parties are the same.
They must all be determined and disposed of under the
same treaty and by the same tribunal. If it were possible to read into the treaty a provision authorizing this
commission to assess a penalty against Germany as a
punishment or as an example or deterrent, what warrant
is there for allocating such penalty or any part of it to
any particular claim and how should it be distributed~
Why should one American national who has sustained a
loss receive in addition to full compensation "smart
money" rather than another? Should the full amount
of the penalty be imposed in connection with a particular
claim or in connection with a particular incident out of
which a number of claims arose or in connection with all
acts of a particular class? Why impose a penalty for the
Arts. 231 and 232 and Annex I to Sec. I of Pt. VIII of the treaty of Versailles.
See note 11 to this commission's Administrative Decision No. II banded down this
day.
23
21

TREATY INTERPRETATION

use and benefit of a small group of American nationals
who are a\varded full con1pensation and at the same ti1ne
·waive reimbursement for the cost of the \Var \Vhich falls
on all American taxpayers alike~
If it \Vere competent for this commission to impose such
a ·penalty, vvhat penalty stated in terms of dollars would
suffice as a deterrent~ And if this commission should
arrogate to itself the authority to impose in the form of Treaty
damages a penalty which would effectively serve as a struction.
deterrent, where lie the boundaries of its powers~ It is
not hampered \Vith any constitutional limitations save
those found in the treaty; and if the power to impose a
penalty exists under the treaty may not the commission
exercise that power in a way to affect the future political
relations of the tv1o Governments ~ 25 The mere statement
of the question is its ans\ver. Putting the inquiry only
serves to illustrate ho\v repugnant to the fundamental
princjples of international lavv is the idea that this commission should treat as justiciable the question as to what
penalty should be assessed against Germany as a punishment for its alleged \Vrongdoing. It is our opinion that
as between sovereign nations the question of the right
and po,ver to impose penalties unlimited in amount is
political rather than legal in its nature, and therefore not
a subject \vithin the jurisdiction of this commission.
The treaty is our charter. "V\T e can not look beyond its
express provisions or its clear implications in assessing
damages in any particular claim. vVe hold that its clear
and unam:piguous language does not authorize the imposition of penalties. Hence the fundarnental maxim "It
is not allow'"able to interpret that which has no need of
interpretation" applies. 26 But all of the rules governing
the interpretation of treaties would lead to the same
result were it competent for us to look to them. Some
of these are: rrhe treaty is based upon the resolution of
the Congress of the United States, accepted and adopted
by Germany. The language, being that of the United
States and framed for its benefit, vvill be strictly construed
against it. 27 Treaty provisions must be so construed as
Yattel, Book II, Cllap. XVIII, Eec. 329.
Vattel, Book II, Chap. XVII, sec. 2G3.
27 Vattel, Book II, Chap. XVII, sec. 264: Digest of Justinian, Book II, Title XIV
par. 39, Monro translation, 1904; "Treaties-Their Making and Enforcement" by Sam:
uel B. Crandall, 2d (1916) edition (hereinafter cited as "Crandal "), sec. 171, p. 401~
Pothier on Obligations (Evans, 180G), Vol. I, p. 53 (seventh rule, Art. VII, Chap. I, Pt.
I): '.Yoolsey on International Law, sixth (1891) edition, sec. 113; opinion of Ralston, urn·
pire, Italian·Venezuelnn 1'li.xed Claims Commission, Sambiaggio <;ase, Venezuelan Arbitrations 1903, pp. GG6 and ()88-689.
25
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to best conform to accepted principles of international
law rather than in derogation of them. 28 Penal clauses
in treaties are odious and must be construed most strongly
against those asserting them. 29
·
The treaty is one between tv1o sovereign nations-a
treaty of peace. There is no place in it for any vindictive
or punitive provisions. Germany must make compensation and reparation for all losses falling within its terms
sustained. by American nationals. That compensation
must be full, adequate, and complete. To this extent
Gern1any 'viii be held accountable. But this commission
is vvithout po,ver to impose penalties for the use and
benefit of private clairnants 'vhen the Government of
the United States has exacted none.
This decision in so far as applicable shall be determinative of all cases grow-ing out of the sinking of the steamship Lusitania. All awards in such cases shall be made
as of this date and shall bear interest from this date at
the rate of 5 per cent per annum.
Done at Washington November 1, 1923.

B.

EDWIN

PARKER,

Umpire.
Concurring in the conclusions:
CHANDLER P. ANDERSON,

American Commissioner.
W.

KIESSELBACH,

German Commissioner.
28 Opinion of Plumley, umpire, in Arao Mines (Ltd.) case, British-Venezuelan :rvnxed
Claims Commission, pp. 344 and 386-387 Venezuelan Arbitrations 1903; reference to
Sambiaggio case in note 27 above; Vilas v. Manila, 1911, 220 United States 345, 358-359;
Crandall, sec. 170.
~9 Vattel, Book II, Chap. XVII, sees. 301-303; Crotius, Book II, Chap. XVI, Sec. X
and par. 3 of Sec. XII.
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OPINION CONSTRUING THE PHRASE "NAVAL AND
MILITARY WORKS OR 1\IATERIALS" AS APPLIED TO
HULL LOSSES AND ALSO DEALING WIT,H REQUISITIONED DUTCH SHIPS
March 25, 1924.
(Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany, p. 75)

The United States of America on its own behalf, acting through the
United States Shipping Board and/or the United States Shipping
Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, and on behalf of certain
of its nationals suffering losses at sea, v. Gerrnany. Docket
Nos. 29, 127, and 546-556 inclusive.

PARKER, Umpire, delivered the opinion of the commission, the German Gommissioner concurring in the
con~lusions, and the American commissioner concurring
save as his dissent is indicated:
There is here presented a group of 13 typical cases in
which the United States, in some instances on its o'vn
behalf and in others on behalf of certain of its nationals,
is seeking compensation for losses suffered through the
destruction of ships by Germany or her allies during the
period of belligerency. These claims do not embrace
damages resulting from loss of life, injuries to persons,
or destruction of cargoes but are limited to losses of the
ships themselves, sometimes hereinafter designated i( hull
losses. '' 30
With the exception of the construction and the ap- questwn.
Li~itation
plication to requisitioned Dutch ships of the phrase
"property * * * belonging to" as found in paragraph 9 of Annex I to Section I of Part VIII of the
treaty of Versailles as carried by reference into the
treaty of Berlin, the sole question considered and decided
in this opinion is: Were any or all of the 13 hulls in
question when destroyed "naval and military 'vorks or
materials" within the 'meaning of that phrase as used
in that paragraph~
The cases in 'vhich an affirmative ans,ver to tb is
question is given must, on final submission, be dismissed
on the ground that Germany is not obligated to pay such
losses under the treaty of Berlin. The cases in '\rhich
a negative answer is given 'vill be reserved by the commission for 'further consideration of the other issues
raised.
The commission is not here concerned 'vith the quality
of the act causing the damage. 'l'ho torins of the treaty
ao Reference is made to definition of terms rontnin~d in Administrative Decision No . I.

of

190

CLAIMS COl\1:1\fiSS IO K - U NITED STATES AND GERlVIANY

fix and limit Germany's obligations to pay, and the coinmission is not concerned with inquiring 'vhether the act
for which she has accepted responsibility \VaS legal or
illegal as measured by rules of international law. It is
probable that a large percentage of the financial obligations imposed by said paragraph 9 would not arise under
the rules of international law but are terms imposed by
the victor as one of the conditions of peace.
st!::c~i~~~s conThe phrase "naval and military works or materials"
has no technical signification. It is not found in previous
treaties. It has never been construed judicially or by any
administrative authority save the reparation co1nmission.
The construction by that body is not binding on this
commission nor is it binding on Germany under the
treaty of Berlin. It will, ho\vever, be considered by this
commission as an early ex parte construction of this
language of the treaty by the victorious European allies,
who participated in drafting it and are the principal
beneficiaries thereunder.
The construction of this phrase is of first impression,
and the commission must, in construing and applying it,
look to its context. It is found in the principal reparation
Treaty of Ver- provisions of the treaty of Versailles as embraced in
sailles.
. •
.
article 232 and the Annex I expressly referred to therein.
That article, after reciting that the "allied and associated
governinents recognize that the resources of Germany are
not adequate * * * to make complete reparation
for all" losses and damages to which they and their
nationals had been subjected as a consequence of the \Var,
provides that:
"The allied and associated Governments, ho\vever,
require, and Germany undertakes, that she \vill make
compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the allied and associ a ted po,vers and to their
property during the period of the belligerency of each
as an allied or associated power against Germany by
such aggression by land, by sea, and from the air, and in
general all damage as defined in Annex I hereto."
Reparation
It is apparent that the controlling consideration in the
minds of the draftsmen of this article \Vas that Germany
should be required to make compensation for all damages
suffered by the civilian pop1.tlation of each of the allied
and associated powers during the period of its belligerency.
It \Vas the reparation of the private losses sustained by the
civilian population that \vas uppermost in the minds of
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the makers of the treaty rather than the public losses of
the governments of the allied and associated powers 'vhich
represented the cost to them of prosecuting the war. 32
Article 232 n1akes express reference to "Annex I
hereto" as more particularly defining the damages for
which Germany is obligated to make compensation.
Annex I provides that "compensation may be claimed
from Germany under article 232 above in respect of the
total damage under the follovving categories." Then
follows an enumeration of 10 categories, of which Nos.
1, 2, 3, 4, 8, and 10 deal solely with damages suffered by
the civilian populations of the allied and associated
powers. Categories 5, 6, and 7 deal with reimbursement
to the governments of the allied and associated powers as
such of the cost to them of pension and separation allowances, rather than damages suffered by the "civilian
population." The Governinent of the United States has
expressly committed itself against presenting claims
arising under these three categories. 33 There remains of
the 10 categories enumerated in Annex I only category 9,
which reads:
"(9) Damage in respect of all property wherever situated belonging to any of the allied or associated states clasEs.x c e Pte
or their nationals, with the exception of naval and military
works or materials, which has been carried off, seized,
injured or destroyed by the acts of Germany or her allies
on land, on sea, or from the air, or damage directly in
consequence of hostilities or of any operations of war."
Under the terms of this paragraph arise Germany's
financial obligations, if any, to pay the claims novv before
this commission for the hulls destroyed during the period
of belligerency.
It can not be doubted that the language of this paragraph 9 so expands that used in article 232 as to include G overnment
.
l
.
propert y.
certain property osses sustained by the governments of
the allied and associated po,vers as well as the losses sustained by their "civilian populations." It 'vas found that
32
The reparations provided for in the exchange of notes bet ween the United States
and German~ eulminating in the armistiee of November 11 , 1918, executed by t he military representatives of the belligerent powers, were lim ited to reparations for losses to
the eivilian population. The Lansing note of November 5, 1918, provides that the allied
powers "understand that eompensat ion will be m ade by Germany for all damage done
to the cil'ilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany
by land, by sea, and from the air."
ltalies appearing throughout t his op~ nion nre, as a rul e, added b y t he commission.
33
See note 11 of Administ rati ve Decision No . 11 , pp. 14 and 15 of Decisions and
Opinions of this commission.
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"Materials."

property belonging to the victorious po,vers not designed
or used for military purposes had been destroyed or damaged, so in addition to requiring that Germany compensate the civilian. population for their property losses this
paragraph requires that Germany shall also compensate
those governments for government losses suffe~ed through
destruction or damage with respect to property of a nonmilitary character. Much property belonging to the
governments of the victorious po\vers, especially to the
governments of the European allies, and not impressed
by reason of its inherent nature or of its use \Vith a military
character, had been destroyed or damaged. Under this
provision it is clear that Germany is obligated to compensate the governn1ents suffering such losses. But,
reading the reparation provisions as a \vhole, it is equally
clear that the allied and associated po,vers did not intend
to require that Ger1nany should compensate them, and
that Germany is not obligated to compensate them, for
losses suffered by them resulting from the destruction or
damage of property impressed with a military character
either by reason of its inherent nature or by the use to
which it was devoted at the time of the loss. Property
so impressed with a military character is embraced within
the phrase "naval and military works or materials" as
used in paragraph 9, which class described by this phrase
will sometimes hereinafter be referred to as "excepted
class.''
This phrase, in so far as it applies to hulls for the loss of
which claims are presented to this commission, relates
solely to ships operated by the United States, not as
merchantmen, but directly in furtherance of a military
operation against Germany or her allies. A ship privately operated for private profit can not be impressed
with a military character, for only the government can
lawfully engage in direct warlike activities.
By the terms of the treaty of Versailles, the French and
English texts are both authentic. The French \VOTd
"materiel," in the singular, is used in the French text,
against which the English \Vord "materials," in the plural,
is used in the English text. Littre, \Vhose dictionary is
accepted as an authority on the French language, defines
"materiel" thus: "'!''he articles of all kinds taken as a
whole \Vhich arc used for some public service in contradistinction to personnel," and he gives as an example

MATERIALS

materiel of an army, the baggage, ammunition, etc., as
distinguished from the men.
The Century Dictionary defines this French \vord
thus: "The assemblage or totality of things used or
needed in carrying on any complex business or operation,
in distinction from the personnel, or body of persons,
employed in the same: applied more especially to military
supplies and equipments, as arms, ammunition, baggage,
·
provisions, horses, wagons, etc."
The English word "materials" means the constituent
or component parts of a product or "that of or with
which any corporeal thing is or may be constituted, made,
or done" (Century Dictionary).
Reading the French and English texts together, it is
apparent that the word "materials" is here used in a
broad and all inclusive sense, \Vith respect to all physical
properties not attached to the soil, pertaining to either
the naval or land forces and impressed with a military
character; while the word "works" connotes physical
properties attached to the soil, sometimes designated in
military parlance as "installations," such as forts, naval
coast defenses, arsenals, dry docks, barracks, cantonments, and similar structures. The term "materials"
as here used includes raw products, semifinished products, and finished products, implements, instruments,
appliances, and equipment, embracing all movable
property of a physical nature from the ra\V material to
the completed implement, apparatus, equipment, or
unit, whether it were an ordinary hand grenade or a
completed and fully equipped warship, provided that it
was used by either the naval or land forces of the United
States in direct furtherance of a military operation against
Germany or her allies.
While it is difficult if not impossible to so clearly define
the phrase "naval and military \Vorks or materials" that
the definition can be readily applied to the facts of every
claim for the loss of a hull pending before this commission,
the true test stated in general terms is: Was the ship
when destroyed being operated by the United States for
purposes directly in furtherance of a military operation
against Germany or her allies~ If it \Vas so operated,
then it is embraced \vi thin the excepted class and Germany
is not obligated to pay the loss. If it \vas not so operated,
it is not embraced \vithin the excepted class and Germany
is obligated to pay the loss.
33474--25t----14
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The United States Shipping Board (sometimes hereinafter referred to as "Shipping Board") exerted such a
far-reaching influence over American shipping both prior
to and during the period of American belligerency that
the scope and effect of its activities and powers must be
clearly understood in order to reach sound conclusions
with respect to the cases here under consideration.
g
The Shipping Board v1as established in pursuance of the
. act of the Congress of the United States of September 7,
1916 (39 Statutes at Large, 728), entitled "An act to
establish a United States Shipping Board for the purpose
of encouraging, developing, and creating a naval auxiliary
and naval reserve and a merchant marine to meet the
requirements of the commerce of the United States with
its Territories and possessions and with foreign countries;
to regulate carriers by water engaged in the foreign and
interstate commerce of the United States; and for other
purposes." The act as amended provided that the
members of the board should be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Senate; that they
should be selected with due regard for the efficient discharge of the duties imposed on them by the act; that
two should be appointed from States touching the Pacific
O~ean, t"\VO from States touching the Atlantic Ocean,
one from States touching the Gulf of Mexico, one from
States touching the Great Lakes, and one from · the
interior, but that not more than one should be appointed
from the same State and not more than four from the
same political party. All employees of the board \Vere
selected from lists supplied by the Civil Service Commission and in accordance with the civil-service law. The
board was authorized to have constructed and equipped,
as well as "to purchase, lease: or charter, vessels suitable,
as far as the commercial requirements of the marine trade
of the United ~tates may permit, for use as naval auxiliaries or Army transports, or for other naval or military
purposes."
The President was authorized to transfer "either permanently or for limited periods to the board such vessels
belonging to the War or Navy Department as are suitable
~for commercial uses and not required for military or naval
use in time of peace."
Provision was made for the American registry and
enrollment of vessels purchased, chartered, or leased from
the board and it was provided that "Such vessels while

SHIPPING BOARD

e'lnployed solely as merchant vessels shall be subject to all
laws, regulations, and liabilities governing merchant
vessels, whether the United States be interested therein as
owner, in 'vhole or in part, or hold any mortgage, lien, or
other interest therein."
The board was authorized to create a corporation with ti!I.cet
a capital stock of not to exceed $50,000,000 "for the
purchase, construction, equip1nent, lease, charter, maintenance, and operation of merchant vessels in the conunerce
o.f the United States." In pursuance of this latter provision the United States Shipping Board En1ergency
Fleet Corporation (sometimes hereinafter referred to as
"Fleet Corporation") 'vas organized under the la,vs of
the District of Columbia "\Vith a capital stock of $50,000,000, all fully paid and all held and o"rned by the United
States save the qualifying shares of the trustees. l Jndcr
the terms of the act, this corporation could not engage
in the operation of vessels o'vned or controlled by it
unless the board should be unable to contract 'vith citizens
of the United States for the purchase or operation thereof.
Then followed in the act numerous provisions clothing
the board 'vith broad powers with respect to transportation by water of passengers ~r property ip interstate
and foreign commerce, provisions for investigations and
hearings, for the fixing of maximum rates, and for
penalties for failure to observe the terms of the statutes
and the orders of the board.
The act as amended provided that it "may be cited as
'shipping act, 1916.' " The board created by virtue of
its terms possessed none of the indicia of a military
tribunal. Its members, all civilians, were dra,vn from
remote sections, that the board might represent the commercial and shipping interests of the entire Nation. The
act taken in its entirety indicates that the controlling
purpose of the Congress wa·s to promote the developmcn t
of an American merchari·t marine and also "as .far as the
cor11mercial requirements of the marine trade of the United
States may permit" provide vessels susceptible of "usc
as naval auxiliaries or Ar1ny transports, or for other
naval or military purposes". 'fhis act "\Vas approved
September 7, 1016, during the period of An1crican
neutrality. The \Vorld War had found American
nationals engaged in an extensive foreign commerce but
without an adequate merchant marine to keep it afloat.
'l'he channels of An1erican foreign commerce 'vould have
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been choked but for the use of belligerent bottoms 'vith
the resultant risks. This situation, coupled 'vith the
possibility of the developments of the war forcing
American participation therein, prompted the enactment
of this statute for the creation of a merchant marine and
setting up the n1achinery for the mobilization and
control of all American shipping.
Following America's entrance into the war on April 6,
1917, Congress through the enactment of several statutes
· clothed the President of the United States 'vith broad
powers including the taking over of title or possession
by purchase or requisition of construc.tecl vessels or parts
thereof or charters therein and the operation, management
and disposition of such vessels and all other vessels
theretofore or thereafter acquired by the United States.
From time to time through Executive orders the President
being thereunto duly authorized, delegated these po,vers
'vith respect to shipping to the Shipping Board, to be
exercised directly by it or, in its discretion, by it through
the Fleet Corporation.
Under these powers the Shipping Board and the Fleet
Corporation proceeded to req-qisition the use of all powerdriven steal cargo vessels of American registry of 2,500
tons dead weight or over and all passenger vessels of
American registry of 2,500 tons gross registry or over
adapted to ocean service. Immediately upon the execution of these requisition orders a "requisition charter"
was entered in to between the Shipping Board and the
o'vner, fixing the compensation to be paid by the' United
States to the owner for the use of the vessel and providing for the operation of the vessel on 'vhat was known
as the "time-form" basis, the board reserving the right
to change the charter to a "bare-boat" basis on giving
five days' notice. The time-form basis provided for the
operation of the vessel by the owner as agent of the United
States and fixed the terms and conditions of such operation, stipulating, among other things, that the O"\\rner should
pay all expenses of operation, including the w·ages and
fees of the master, officers, and cre,v, and should assume
all marine risks, including collision liabilities, but that the
United States should assume all 'var risks. The Shipping
Board directed the O"'\Vne,r as its agent to operate the vessel
in its regular trade. The bare-boat basis •provided that
all the expenses of 1nanning, victualling, and supplying the
vessel and all other costs of operation should be borne by

REQUISITION

the United States. This latter form \Vas used in requisitioning ships for service in the War Department, and also
in some other instances where requisitioned ships were
delivered by the Shipping Board to third parties to operate as agents of the United States. \Vhen a ship was delivered by the Shipping Board to the War Department
no formal agreement \Vas entered into between these t\VO
Governn1ent agencies, but the vVar Department recognized the agreement between the Shipping Board and
the owner of the vessel and duly accounted to the Shipping Board under the terms and conditions of the requisition charter.
vVhen the requisitioned vessel was redelivered to the
owner for operation by him under a time-form requisition
charter, an ''operating agreement'' was also enter·ed into
between the Fleet Corporation, acting for the United
States, and the owner, \Vhereby the o\vner as agent of
the Fleet Corporation undertook the operation of the
vessel, including the procurement of cargoes and the
physical control of the ship. For these services the O\Vner
as agent received stipulated fees and commissions in addition to the compensation which he received as O\Vncr
for the use of the vessel as provided in the requisition
charter.
\Vhen the vessel was requisitioned under a bare-boat
form charter and delivered to a third party other than
an established government agency to operate, a "managing agreement" was entered in to bet,veen the Fleet Corporation and such third party whereby the latter as
agent for the Fleet Corporation assumed physical control
of the ship, :receiving fees and commissions for such
services.
It was not the practice of the Shipping Board or the
Fleet Corporation to issue detailed and minute instruc.tions to agents operating requisitioned vessels with respect to the conduct of the particular voyage or the
particular cargoes \vhich such vessels should carry. These
operating or managing agents \Vere selected because of
their experience and ability in handling commercial shipping. While the United States reserved to itself full
power and authority to exercise complete control over
vessels requisitioned by it, such control \Vas in practice
delegated to the operating or managing agent, \vho exercised his sound discretion in the management of ships
operated by him as agent, \vith a vie'v to preventing any
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unnecessary dislocation of trade or disturbance 1n the
established channels of commerce.
Thus the United States through the agencies of the
Shipping Board and the Fleet Corporation effectively
and speedily mobilized all American shipping, exercising
such control over it that, as emergency required, it could
be immediately utilized by the Unite.d States in the
prosecution of its military operations against its enemies;
but pending such emergency the requisitioned vessels
were commercially operated, by their owners or by third
parties, as agents of the United States, and these agents
'vere given the greatest latitude and freedom of action
in the management and control of vessels operated by
them in order to prevent any unnecessary disturbance
in the free move1nent of commerce. Under the requisition charter it was expressly stipulated that the vessel
"shall not have the status of a public ship, and shall be
subject to all laws and regulations governing merchant
vessels * * *. When, however, the requisitioned vessel
is engaged in the service of the War or Navy Department, the
vessel shall have the status of a public ship, and * * *
the master, officers, and crew shall become the immediate
employees and agents of the United States, with all the
rights and duties of such, the vessel passing completely
into the possession and the master, officers, and cre'v absolutely under the control of the United States." At
another point in the requisition charter it was stipulated
that the master "shall be the agent of the owner in all
matters respecting the management, handling, and navigation of the vessel, except when the vessel becomes a public
ship."
The German agent contends that presu.mptively the
control by the Shipping Board thus exercised over vessels,
char- whether owned by the United States or held by the United
States under requisition, was in furtherance of the conduct of the military effort of the United States against
Germany, and hence-in the absence of satisfactory
proof to the contrary, the burden being on the United
States-all such vessels 1nust be classed as "naval and
military works or materials." 1'he conunission has no
hesitation in rejecting this contention. After A1nerica
entered the war, its entire commerce and industry " .,. ere
in a broad sense 1nobilized for 'var. Because of the
urgent war requiren1ents, 8teel and nu1nerous other
products beeame govern1nent-controlled coininodities,

MILITARY WORKS

their uses being rigidly restricted to war purposes. Yet
it can not be contended that the fact that an American
steel plant was operated 100 per cent on war work raised
a prima facie presumption of its conversion into "military
works." The railroads of the United States were taken
over and operated by the Government as a war measure,
but this did not presumptively convert them into "military works or materials" within the meaning of that term
as used in the treaty of Versailles. Nor can the mobilization for 'var of American shipping through the agency of
the Shipping Board create even a rebuttable presumption
that the vessels so Inobilized, whether owned or req uisitioned by the United States, had a military character.
Nothing short of their operation by the United States
directly in furtherance of a military operation against
Germany can have such an effect. So long as such vessels
were performing the functions of merchant vessels, even
though engaged in a service incidei1t to the existence of a
state of war; they will not fall within the excepted class.
Construing the shipping act, the Executive orders of
the President, and the provisions of an operating agreement similar to that hereinbefore described, the Supreme
Court of the United States held a vessel owned by the
Fleet Corporation but operated by an American national
as an agent of the Shipping Board was a merchant vessel
and subject to libel in admiralty for the consequences of
a collision. 34 It is apparent that a vessel either o'vned or
r.equisitioned by the Shipping Board or Fleet Corporation
and operated by an agent of the United States under such
an operating or managing agreement as hereinbefore
described was a merchant1nan and in no sense impressed
with a military character.
When, ho,vever, the Shipping Board delivered such
vessels to either the War Department or the Navy
Department of the United States their status at once
changed and they became public ships; their masters,
officers, and crews at once became employees and agents
of the United States with all of the resultant rights and
duties; and it will be presumed .that such delivery 'vas
made to the military arn1s of the Go~ernment to enable
them to be used (in the language of section 5 of the
shipping act) "as naval auxiliares or army transports,
or for other naval or military p11rposes ." Such assignment
of vessels to and their operation by the ar Department

''r

u The Lake .M onroe (1919) 250 U . S. 246.
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or the Navy Department will be treated by the commission as prima facie but not conclusive evidence of their
military or naval character. The facts in each case 'viii
be carefully examined and \veighed by the commission
in order to determine whether or not the particular ship,
at the time of her destruction was operated by the United
States directly in furtherance of a miliatry operation
against Germany or her allies. If she was so operated,
she will fall within the excepted class; otherwise she will
not.
The application of this general rule to the facts as
disclosed by the records in the 13 typical cases. preliminarily submitted will illustrate its scope ~nd its limitations.
Case No. 127, steamship Rockingham
The steamship Rockingham, ~nvned and operated by the
Garland Steamship Corporation, an American national,
sailed on ·April 16, 1917, from Baltimore, Md., via Norfolk, Va., which she left April . 19, bound for Liverpool,
England, v;ith a general cargo for numerous consignees.
She was armed for defensive purposes \vith tv;ro 4-inch
guns, one fore and one aft, manned by a civilian crew of
36, and in addition had a naval gun cre'v of 13 enlisted
men. She was sunk by a German submarine on May 1,
1917, before reaching Liverpool. In the early part of the
afternoon of May 1, the weather being hazy, two small
. objects were sighted by the Rockingham at a distance of
approximately 5 miles, one on the starboard bo\v, the
other on the port quarter, and assuming that they were
German submarines the master steered a zig-zag course
in accordance 'vith instructions issued by the United
States Navy Department designed to elude the operations of hostile subn1arines. The two objects \Vere seen
to submerge and thereafter were not sighted until after
the sinking. The gun crew of the Rockingham had,
therefore, no target to fire upon, and no effort was made
at resistance. 'l'he attack was upon the starboard side,
was made without \Varning the torpedo entering the
engine room, tearing a great hole in the ship and causing
her to sink in 25 minutes.
The German agent contends that the Rockingharlf. at
the time of her destruction had lost her status as a
private peaceful trading ship and had become "naval
and 1nilitary * * * materials" as that term is used

steamer Rockinuham.
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in the treaty because: (1) she was armed, (2) her guns
were manned by a navai gun crew, (3) she \vas operated
in accordance with instructions given by the Navy
Department of the United States although by a civilian
n1aster with a civilian cre,v. The contention is that,
notwithstanding such arming and manning and operation
1nay have been entirely legal and justified, they nevertheless stripped the Rockingham of her character of a
peaceful merchantman and impressed her with a military
character.
This contention must be rejected. It is clear that the
Roclcingha1n was being privately operated by an American national for private profit. She was armed in pursuance of the policy adopted by the Government of the
United States, of which all foreign missions in Washington were given formal notice on March 12, 1917, during
the period of American neutrality, in the following
language:
"In view of the announcement of the Imperial German merchant.
Arming or
vessels.
Government on January 31, 1917, that all ships, those
of neutrals included, met \vithin certain zones of the
high seas would be sunk without any precautions being
taken for the safety of the persons on board, and without
the exercise of visit and search, the Government of the
United States. has determined to place upon all American
merchant vessels sailing through the barred areas an
armed guard for the protection of the vessels and the
lives of the persons on board."
The instructions given by theN avy Department of the
United States to the masters of these merchant vessels
and to the commanders of the naval gun crews clearly
indicate that the purpose of so arming and operating
such vessels was to protect against the offensive operations
of German submarines and to elude or escape from them
if possible, and not to initiate offensive operations against
such submarines. The control in the nature of routing
instructions \vhich the civilian masters received from the
Navy Department and followed 'vas designed to avoid
and to escape from the submarine, not to seek them out
and destroy them~
The arming for defensive purposes of a merchantman
and the manning of such armament by a naval gun cre\v,
coupled with the routing of such ship by the Navy
Department of the United States for the purpose of
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avoiding the danger of submarines and the following by
the civilian master of the ship of instructions given by
the Navy Department for the defense of the ship \vhen
in danger of attack by submarines, certainly do not
change the juridical status of the ship or convert it
from a merchant ship to a war ship or make of it naval
material.
The commission holds that the Rockingham. at the
time of her destruction was being operated as a merchant
vessel and that she does not fall within the excepted class.
Case No. 551, steamship . .Mota no-oil tanker
The steamship Molano, owned and operated by the
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, an American national,
sailed from New York on July 6, 1917, \vith a cargo of fuel
oil for account of the British ship control for use of the
British Admiralty. She left Plymouth v1ith other vessels
convoyed by three British destroyers for Portsmouth,
England, as her final discharge port. She was armed for
defensive purposes with two 3-inch guns, one fore and one
aft, and had a civilian master and crew of 33 men and a
gun cre\v of 13 enlisted men of the United States Navy.
She was sunk on July 31, 1917, on her voyage between
Plymouth and Portsmouth by a torpedo fired by a German submarine. The air was hazy, the sea· choppy, the
submarine had not been sighted, and no resistance \vas
made by the naval gun crew. The Molano was insured
with the British Government for $616,000, \vhich sum has
been paid to the claimant, and this clain1 is made for the
difference between that amount and the true value of the
vessel, which difference is placed at the sum of $594,000,
plus interest and expenses.
The German agent contends that the Molano at the
time of her destruction constituted "naval * * *
works or materials" because (1) she carried armament
susceptible of usc for hostile purposes and \vas manned
by a naval gun cre\v, (2) she was convo ycd by regular
fighting forces of a belligerent po\ver, and (3) she \vas controlled by the belligerent British Govern1ncnt and used
for warlike purposes. The commission rejects this contention because it is apparent that the . .Molano \vas privately owned and privately operated for private profit,
was not employed or designed to be employed directly in
furtherance of a military operation of the United States
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or its associated powers against Ger1nany or her allies,
and '\vas not impressed with a military character.
We have heretofore exan1ined the test of armament
manned by a naval gun crew on a privately operated
comn1ercial ship and held .that it did not have the effect
of converting such ship into naval material.
The German agent \Vith great earnestness and ability
insists that a ship associating itself '\vith a belligerent
convoy assumes the character of its associates and
that '\vhcn it becon1es a part of the convoy flotilla,
which is a military unit and subject to navai instructions and naval control, it participates in hostilities
and 1nust be classed as naval material. We have no
quarrel \vith the contention that· a vessel, whether neutral or belligerent, for1ning part of a convoy under belligerent escort may, through the n1ethods prescribed by
international la'\v, be la·wfully condemned and destroyed
as a belligerent. But that is not the question before
this commission. If \Ve assume that the Motano-a
belligerent merchantman-was lawfully destroyed, this
does not affect the result. The fact that the lfotano,
because of its helpless and nonmilitary character, sought
the protection of a convoy and voluntarily subjected
itself to naval in'structions as to routing and operation, for
the purpose of avoiding the German submarines rather
than seeking them out to engage them in' combat, certainly can not, by some mysterious and alchemic process,
have the effect of transforming the ship from a merchantman into naval material. The control exercised by the
British Government over the Motano was not such as to
affect its status. Such control was limited to directions
looking to the protection of the vessel and the furtherance of its commercial activities, and not directly in furtherance of any military operation against Germany for
her allies.
The C'Oinmission therefore concludes that the Motano
at the ti1ne of her destruction maintained her character
as a peaceful comn1ercial vessel and that she docs not.
fall within the excepted class.

Encmyconv oy

Decision.

Case No. 29, steamship Pinar del Rio
The steamship Pinar del Rio, O\vned by the American
'-\:; Cuban Steamship Line (Inc.), an American national ,
\Vas requisitioned by the United States through the

P inardel RioJ
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Shipping Board, and a time-form requisition charter was
entered into February 4, 1918. By the terms of this
charter the owner became the agent of the Shipping
Board and as such continued to operate the ship. She
was unarmed and manned by a civilian crc,v. While en
route from Cuba to Boston wl.th a cargo of sugar she
was sunk, on June 8, 1918, through gunfire by a German
submarine.
It is apparent that at the time of her destruction she
was being operated as a merchant vessel and in no sense
impressed 'vith a military character. She does not,
therefore, fall within the excepted class.
Case No. 550, steamship Rochester
The Rochester .

The steamship Rochester, owned and operated by the
Rochester Navigation Corporation, an American national, after having discharged a general cargo at Man·chester, England, sailed from that port in ballast October
26, 1917. She was armed for defensive purposes 'vith
two 3-inch guns, mounted one fore and one aft, and had
a civilian crew of 36 men and a naval gun crew. of 13
men. After leaving Manchester she 'vith nine other
merchantmen was convoyed for several days by five
destroyers and one armed cruiser, and, after the convoying ships returned to their base, the Rochester 'vas sunk
on November 2, 1917, by a torpedo and shells fired from
a German submarine.
It is apparent that the Rochester at the time of her
destruction was being operated as a merchant vessel and
was not in any sense impressed 'vith a military character.
The commission, therefore, finds that the Rochester does
not fall within the excepted class.
Case No. 555, steamship Moreni-oil tanker

The Moreni.

The steamship Moreni, o'vned and operated by the
Standard Oil Co. of Ne'v Jersey, an American national,
sailed from Baton Rouge, La., May 19, 1917, 'vith a
cargo of gasoline consigned to the Italian-American Oil
Co., at Savona, Italy, to call at Gibraltar for orders.
She was armed for defensive purposes w-ith t'vo 4-inch
guns, one fore and one aft, and manned 'vith a civilian
crew of 35 and a naval gun crew of 12. 1\..fter calling at Gibraltar for orders she sailed from that port
June 10, 1917, and on the morning of June 12 'vas fired
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upon and finally sunk by a German submarine after a
running fight in which the Moreni endeavored to escape
and in which 200 to 250 shots were fired by the submarine
and about 150 shots by the Moreni.
It is apparent that the Jforeni was at the time of her
destruction being privately operated for private profit as
a merchant vessel, and for the reasons heretofore given
the commission holds that she does not fall within the
~xcepted class.
Case No. 549, steamship Alamance
The steamship Alamance, owned by the G~rland Steamship Corporation, an American national, was requisitioned by the Shipping Board October 20, 1917, and at
once redelivered to the Garland Steamship Corporation
under a time-form requisition charter, executed December 28, 1917, by the terms of which the owner operated
the vessel as agent of the Shipping Board. She "'"as
manned with a civilian crew of 38 men, armed for defensive purposes with two 4-inch guns, one fore and one aft,
which \Vere manned by a naval gun crew of 19 men. On
February 5, 1918, while en route from Hampton Roads,
Va., to Liverpool, England, with a cargo consisting principally of tobacco, cotto:Q., zinc, and lumber, and while in
a convoy of 15 ships escorted by naval vessels, she \Vas
torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine.
For the reasons heretofore given the commission holds
that at the time of her destruction the Alamance was a
merchant vessel and that she does not fall within the
excepted class.

The A la mance.

Case No. 553, steamship Tyler
The steamship Tyler, owned by the Old Dominion
Steamship Co., of New York, an American national, \vas
requisitioned by the Shipping Board November 29, 1917,
and a time-form requisition charter executed on January
4, 1918. On ~A:arch 2, 1918, the Shipping Board entered
into an operating agreement \vith Chase Leaveth & Co.
by the terms of \Vhich they operated the Tyler as agent
of the Shipping Board, and she \Vas being so operated at
the time of her destruction. She \Vas manned by a
civilian cre\Y, armed for defensive purposes \vith t\vo
3-inch guns, one fore and one aft, \vhich were manned by
a naval gun crew of 19 men. On April 30, 1918, the

The Tf)ler.
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Tyler left Genoa, Italy, in convoy, bound for New York
in ballast. On May 2, 1918, she was sunk by torpedoes
fired by a German submarine.
For the reasons hereinabove given the commission
holds that at the time of her destruction the Tyler 'vas a
merchantman in no sense impressed 'vith a military character, and hence is not within the excepted class.

Case No. 554, steamship Santa llfaria-oil tanker
T hc

Maria.

Santa

The steamship Santa ],faria, owned by the Sun Co., an
American national, was requisitioned by the Shipping
Board October 12, 1917, delivered on January 14~ 1918,
and on the same day redelivered to the owner, which
operated her as agent of the Shipping Board under a
requisition agreement constituting a part of the requisition charter. She sailed from Chester, Pa., the latter
part of January, 1918, via Norfolk, Va., bound for Great
Britain in convoy 'vith a cargo of fuel oil. She 'vas manned by a civilian crew of 39 men, armed 'vith t'vo 4-inch
guns, one fore and one aft, and had a naval gun crew of
22 men. On February 25, while under convoy of British
trawlers, she was sunk by a torpedo fired by a German
submarine.
The commission holds that at the time of her destruction the Santa Maria was a merchant vessel and that she
does not fall 'vithin the excepted class.
Case No. 552, steamship Meralc

The Mtrak,

By virtue of a proclamation of the President of the
United States of March 20, 1918, 87 vessels of Holland
registry and belonging to her nationals, lying in American
ports, were, in accordance with international law and
practice, requisitioned by the United States, the President
in his proclamation directing that the Shipping Board
"make to the owners thereof full compensation, in accordance 'vith the principles of international la,v." Of
these vessels 46, including the steamships -~ffrak and
T~xel, were delivered to the Shipping Board.
The Meralc 'vas operated as a merchantman by W esseI
Dn \Tal & Co., American nationals, as agents of the Shipping Board. She sailed under the American flag, '.vas
unarmed, and 'vas manned by a civilian cre,v. While en
route from Norfolk, Va., to Chile with a cargo of 4,000
tons of coal she 'vas, on August 6, 1918, captured by a
Ger1nan submarine and sunk by bo1nbs.

DUT'CH SHIPS REQUISITIONED

Case No. 556, steamship Texel

207
The Texel.

As appears from the statement made in connection with
the Merak case supra, the steamship Texel was one of the
Dutch ships requisitioned by the United States and assigned to the Shipping Board, after which she was operated by the New York & Porto Rico Steamship Co. as
agent for the Shipping Board. She "ras unarmed and
manned by a civilian crew. She sailed under the· American flag from Ponce, P. R., on May 27, 1918, for New
York with a cargo of sugar. On June 2, she was attacked
by a German submarine, overhauled, and sunk by bombs.
It is apparent that the steamships Merak and Texel
\vere at the time of their destruction being operated as
merchant vessels and in no sense impressed with a military character. For the reasons heretofore given the
commission holds that neither the steamship Jferak nor
the steamship Texel falls vlithin the excepted class, and
that neither can in any sense be held to have constituted
"naval and military works or materials" as that phrase
is used in the treaty.
But notwithstanding this holding the German agent "Belonging. to."
contends that these claims do not fall within the terms
of the treaty of Berlin because these Dutch ships were not
vessels "belonging to" the United States or its nationals
as that term is used in the paragraph 9 here under consideration. That these ships \Vere lawfully requisitioned,
reduced to possession, and operated by the 'United States
is conceded by Germany. It results that at the time of
their destruction the right of the United States to possess
and use them against all the world \Vas absolute and
superior to any possible contingent rights or interests of
those Dutch nationals who o\vned them at the time they
were requisitioned. That the United States had at least
a special or qualified property in these ships there can be
no doubt. They were lawfully in its possession, sailing
under its flag, used as it saw fit without regard to the
wishes of the former owners and during an emergency
the duration of \vhich the United States alone could determine. There never was a time v1hen the Dutch nationals
'vho owned the ships at the tin1e they \Vere requisitioned
could, as a matter of right, demand their return or impose
any limitation \vhatsoevcr upon their operation or control. As the United States had the absolute right against
the whole \vorld to possess these ships and use them as it
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sa"\v fit, conditioned only upon the duty to n1ake adequate
compensation for their use and to return them, at a time
to be determined by it or in the alternative to make adequate compensation, to the Dutch nationals who O"\vned
them at the time they were requisitioned, certain it is
that this amounted to a special or qualified property in
the ships tantamount to absolute ownership thereof for
the time being. The possession of the United States was
analagous to that of a grantee having an estate defeasible
upon the happening of some event completely within his
control.
Where under the terms of a trip or time charter the
holder of the legal title delivers to the charterer the 'vhole
possession and control of the ship, the charterer becomes
the ''owner" thereof during the term of the charter and
is designated as such. 35 The British merchant shipping
(salvage) act, 1916, provides that: "Where salvage services are rendered by any ship belonging to His 111ajesty
* * * the Admiralty shall * * * be entitled to
claim salvage * * * and shall have the same rights
and remedies as if the ship * * * did not belong to
His Majesty." The English courts have held that a
ship requisitioned and operated by the government under
requisition charter "belonged to" His Majesty within
the terms of this act and hence was entitled to salvage. 36
These decisions "\Vhile helpful are not coNtrolling in construing the phrase ''Damage in respect of all property
wherever situated belonging to" the ·United States or its
nationals. "Belonging to". as here used is not a term of
art or a technical legal term. It must be construed in
the popular sense in which the word is ordinarily used,
as synonymous with appertaining to, connectrd with,
having special relation to. That it was used in this
sense is evidenced by reference to this clause of the
French text of the treaty of Versailles, "\vhich reads:
'' Dommages relatifs a toutes proprietes, en quelque lieu
qu'elles soient situees, appartenant a." The use of the
"\Vord "appartenant" is significant. The expression
''belonging to" does not necessarily convey the idea that
as Sandeman v. Scurr (1866), L. n. 2 Q. D. 86; ~farcardier v. Chesapeake Insurance Co.
(1814), 8 Cranch 39, 49; Reed v. United States (1871), 11 'Vallace 591, GOO; Leary v. United
States (1872), 14 'Vallace 607, 610; Kent's Commentaries, 14th edition, Vol. III, p. *138;
Scrutton, Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 11th (1923) edition, art. 2, pp. 4-9.
36 Admiralty Commissioners v. Page and others (1918), 2 K. B. 447, affirmed in (1919)
1 K. B. 299. See also The Sarpen, Court of Appeal (1916), Probate Division, 306, 313;
~faster of Trinity House v. Clark (1815), 4 M. & S. 288.
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the indefeasible legal title to the property "in respect
of" which the damage occurred must have vested in the
United States or its nationals. It is sufficient that the
United States or its nationals had such control over and
interest, general or special, in such property as that
injury or damage to it directly resulted in loss to them.
Had the draftsmen of the treaty intended to restrict
Germany's obligations to pay for damages to property in
which the unconditional legal title was vested in the
allied or associated States or their nationals, they would
have used apt and well-recognized terms to express such
limitation. On the contrary, .it is evident from reading
the reparation provisions as a \vhole that their purpose
and intention was to require Germany to pay all losses
sustained by the allied or associated States or their
nationals resulting from "damage in respect of all property wherever situated" of a nonmilitary character.
While not controlling, it is interesting to note that the
Reparation Commission has placed a similar construction
on the language in question, and gone a step farther than
here indica ted in holding that '' Time chartered neutral
vessels. in respect of which compensation wa.s paid by the
claiming power might also be included [in computing the
amount of Germany's reparation payments under paragraph 9 of Annex I],. though not sailing under the flag
of the po\ver in question."
It follows thn,t the claims for losses resulting from the
destruction of the steamships llferak and Texel fall \vithin
the terms of the treaty of Berlin and that Germany is
obligated to compensate for their loss.

Decision,

Case No. 546, steamship John G. lJ!cOullough
The steamship John G. McCullough, owned by the zo~~
United States Steamship Co., an American national, \Vas
requisitioned by the United States through the Shipping
Board November 6, 1917, under a bare-boat requisition
charter. On the same day she \vas delivered she \vas
turned over to the War Department of the United States
and operated \vith a British civilian cre\v, 32 in number,
employed and paid by and in all things subject to the
orders of the United States War Department. Under
the requisition charter she thereupon became a public
ship.
She was armed \vith one French 90 mm. gun, \vhich
\Vas manned by a British naval cre\v of t\vo gunners.

Jf cCu l-
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Publicship.

While en route, May 18, 1918, from London, England,
in naval convoy to Rochefort, France, with a general
cargo for the Army oj the United States, she was destroyed,
ci ther by a torpedo from a German submarine, as claimed
hy the American agent, or by a mine, which may or may
not have been of German origin. The German agent
denies that she \Vas torpedoed by a German submarine.
The German Admiralty is \Vithout information \Vith respect to her destruction. There is, how. ever, evidence
supporting the allegation that she \Vas torpedoed; but·
in view of the disposition \vhich the commission will make
of this case the cause of her destruction is not material.
At the time the lfcGullough was destroyed she was a
public ship in the possession of and operated by the
United States through its vVar Department, one of the
military arms of the Government whose every effort \vas
concentrated on mobilizing and hurling men and munitions against Germany. She had been requisitioned in
European \Vaters. America's associates in the \var had
assisted in manning and equipping her. France had supplied armament and Great Britain had supplied a naval
gun crew. She was transporting from England to France
supplies for the active fighting forces of the Army of the
United States. She possessed every indicia of a military
character save that she was not licensed to engage in
o_fferisive warfare against enemy ships. Offensive operation on the seas \Vas not her function. The fact that the
legal title to her had not vested in the United States is
wholly immaterial. She Vias in the possession of the
United States. It had the right against all the \Vorld
to hold, use, and operate her and was in fact operating
her through its War Department by a master and cre\v
employed by and subject in every respect to the orders
of the War Department. She \Vas actively performing
a service for the Army on the fighting front. She possessed none of the indicia of a merchant vessel. The
very requisition charter under \vhich she \Vas operating
took pains to declare her a "public ship" and not a merchant vessel subject to the la\vs, regulations, and liabilities as such as was the Lake J,fonroe. 37 She \Vas at the
time of her destruction being utilized for" other * * *
military purposes" \Vi thin the meaning of that phrase as
used in section 5 of the shipping act. She \Vas impre:~sed
\Vith a military character.
a1 The Lake },fonro e, (191 9) 2.')1 U. S . 24J3.
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The taxicabs privately owned and operated for profit
in Paris during September, 1914, 'vere in no sense military materials; but 'vhen these sam·e taxicabs were requisitioned by the military governor of Paris and used to
transport French reserves to meet and repel the oncoming
German Army they became military materials, and so
remained until redelivered to their owners. The automobile belonging to the United States assigned to its
President and constitutional commander in chief of its
Army for use in Washington is in no sense military
materials. But had that same automobile been transported to the battle front in France or Belgium and used
by the same President, it vvould have become a part of
the military equipment of the Army and as such impressed \vith a military character. The steel rails used
in the yards of a steel plant in Pittsburgh for shifting
war rna terials from one part of the plant to another are
not impressed vvith a military character, for they are
privately operated for private profit. But if these same
rails had been taken up and shipped to the American
Army in France and laid by it as a part of its transportation system, used and operated by it for transporting
munitions and supplies to the fighting front, they 'vould
then have become military materials.
So here the Me C~Zlough, by the ter1ns of her requisition
charter stamped a "public ship," actively engaged in
transporting Army supplies to the battle front, operated
by the War Department of the United States through
a cre'W employed and paid by it and subject in all things
to its orders, was at the time of her destruction "military
materials" and not property for which Germany is obligated to pay under the provisions of the treaty of Berlin.

Dec·ision.

Case No. 547, steamship Joseph Cudahy-oil tanker
The steamship Joseph Cudahy, an oil tanker, o'vned by The Jo ..~ e ph
·
I ta1·Ian Commerc1a
· 1 Corporat1on,
·
th e Amer1can
of N e'v Clldahv.
York, an American national, 'vas requisitioned by the
United States through the Shipping Board on October
3, 1917, and on the same day delivered to the War Department and operated by the United States Anny
Transport Service under a bare-boat charter by a civilian
cre'v employed and paid by and in all things subject
to the orders of the Army authorities. She 'vas anned
'vith t'vo 3-inch guns. Her armament 'vas manned by
a United States naval cre'v of 21 men. She had carried
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a cargo of gasoline and naphtha for the United States
Army from Bayonne, N. J., calling first at La Pollice,
France, and then to Le Verdon, and discharged her
cargo at Furt, Gironde River. She sailed from LeV erdon
in ballast on her return trip to New York on August 14,
1918, in convoy with 28 other vessels. The convoy
broke up during the night of August 15. She \Vas torpedoed by a German submarine and sunk on the morning of August 17.
The fact that she was in ballast at the tilne of her
destruction is immaterial. Being a tank ship operated
by and for the exclusive use of the Army Transport
Service of the United States, her return in ballast for
additional supplies of gasoline and naphtha for the
United States Army on the fighting front \Vas an inseparable part of her military operations.
For the reasons set out in connection \Vith the destruction of the John G. McCullough the commission holds
that the Joseph Cudahy at the time of her destruction
was impressed with the character of "military materials"
and that the loss suffered by the United States resulting
from her destruction is not one for which Germany is
obligated to pay under the terms of the treaty of Berlin.
Case No. 548, steamship A. A. Raven
The Raven,

The steamship A. A. Raven, owned by the American
Transportation Co. (Inc.), an American national, 'vas
requisitioned by the United States through the Shipping
Board, and a bare-boat requisition charter \Vas executed
on February 19, 1918. She was delivered to and operated by the War Department with a civilian cre'v employed and paid by and in all respects subject to the
orders of the War Department. She \Vas armed 'vith
two 3-inch guns but had no armed guard at the tin1e of
her loss. vVhile en route in convoy on lVIarch 14, 1918,
from Barry, England, to Brest, and thence to Bordeaux,
France, she \Vas sunk. The German Admiralty has
no record of her having been torpedoed by a Gern1an
submarine a.s claimed by the .A. merican agent. As
pointed out by the German agent, she may possibly
have struck a mine adrift from fields planted by the
Netherlands Government along the Dutch coast not
far froln the point where the A. A. R':JVen \Vas sunk.
The evidence that she was torpedoed, while far froni
satisfactory, is sufficient t.o support the allegation.
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IIowever, in vie'v of the disposition which the commission
'vill make of this case the cause of her destruction is
immaterial.
.
At the time of her destruction she had a cargo of
food, clothing, surgical instruments, hospital supplies,
piping, and rails and 400 tons of explosives, all belonging
to the United States and all designed for the use of the
American Army in France.
For the reasons set forth in connection 'vith the case Decision.
involving the loss of the John G. McCullough the commission holds that the steamship A. A. Raven was at the
time of her destruction in1pressed with a military character and t.hat the resultant loss to the United States is
not one for which Germany is obligated to pay under
the terms of the treaty of Berlin.
From the foregoing the colnmission deduces the follo,ving general rules with respect to the tests to be applied
in determining when hull losses fall within the excepted
class of "naval and militarv works or materials" as that
phrase is found in paragraph 9 of Annex I to Section I
of Part \Till of the treaty of Versailles as carried by
reference into the treaty of Berlin:
I. In order· to bring a ship \Vi thin the excepted class ro?~~1~rr~sse~~Ies
she must have been operated by the United States at
the time of her destruction for purposes directly in
furtherance of a military operation against Germany or
her allies.
II. It is immaterial whether the ship was or was not
o'Yned by the United States; her possession, either actual
or constructive, and her use by the United States in direct
furtherance of a military operation against its then enemies
constitute the controlling test.
III. So long as a ship is privately operated for private
profit she can not be impressed 'vith a military character,
for only the government can lawfully engage in direct
warlike activities.
IV. The fact that a ship was either owned or requisitioned by the Shipping Board or the Fleet Corporation
and operated by one of them, either directly or through
an agent, does not create even a rebuttable presumption
that she "'.vas impressed with a military character.
V. vVhen, ho,vever, a ship, either owned by or requisitioned by the United States during the period of
belligerency, passed into the possession and under the
operation of either th~ War Department or the N nvy
._/
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Department of the United States, thereby becoming a
public ship, her master, officers, and crew all being employed and paid by and subject to the orders of the United
States, it is to be presumed that such possession, control,
and operation by a military arm of a government fo cusing
all of its powers and energies on actively waging 'var,
were directly in furtherance of a military operation.
Such control and operation of a ship will be treated by
the commission as prima .facie, but not conclusive,
evidence of her military character.
VI. Neither (a) the arming for defensive purposes of a
n1erchantman, nor (b) the manning of such armament by
a naval gun crew, nor (c) her routing by theN avy Department of the United States for the purpose of avoiding the
enemy, nor (d) the follo,ving by the civilian master of
such merchantman of instructions given by the Navy
Department for the defense of the ship when attacked
by or when in danger of attack by the enemy, nor (e) her
seeking the protection of a convoy and submitting herself
to naval instructions as to route and operation for the
purpose of avoiding the enemy, nor all of these combined,
will suffice to impress such merchantman 'vith a military
character.
VII. The facts in each case will be carefully examined
and weighed and the commission will determine whether
or not the particular ship at the time of her destruction
was operated by the United States directly in furtherance
of a military operation against Germany or her allies.
If she was so operated she 'vill fall within the excepted
class, otherwise she will not.
The preliminary submissions of the 13 cases specifically
dealt with in this opinion will not be held a waiver of the
right of either the American agent or the German agent
to file in any of them additional proofs bearing on the
points decided. Such additional proofs if filed will be
considered by the commission on the final submission,
when the principles and rules herein announced will be
applied and final decisions rendered. In the absence of
further evidence, the interlocutory decisions herein
rendered in each of these 13 cases will become final.
Done at Washington, March 25, 1924.
ED\VIN

B.

pARKER,

Umpire.

Concurring in the conclusions:
W. KIESSELBACH,
German Commissioner.

RETURN VOYAGE

I concur in the conclusions generally, but not in the
conclusions that on the facts stated with reference to the
Joseph Cudahy she was impressed with the character of
''military and naval "\vorks or materials" within the
1neaning of that phrase as used in the provisions of the
treaty of Versailles under consideration.
One of the conclusions concurred in ir that the control
and operation of a vessel by the War Department of the
United States for Army service, as "\vas the case "\vith the
Joseph Cudahy, constitutes prima facie but not conclusive
evidence of her military character.
Another conclusion concurred in is that in order to
bring a vessel within the excepted class she must have
been operated by the United States at the tin1e of her
destruction "for purposes directly in furtherance of a
military operation against Germany or her allies."
On the facts stated, the Joseph Cudahy was returning
home from France to the ·united States in ballast at the
time of her destruction, so that she was not being operated
at that time "for purposes directly in furtherance of a
military operation against Germany or her allies."
Accordingly the presumption arising from her control
and operation by the War Department is completely
rebutted by her actual use and situation at the time of
her destruction.
CHANDLER

P.

ANDERSON,

American Commissioner.

~ 1 5.

Return voyage ~

